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EMPLOYER DEFENSES TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS
ALLAN H. WEITZMAN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Given the public notoriety of sexual harassment claims, today more than
ever it is necessary for employers to face the potential legal, ethical, and work
.
related problems resulting from sexual harassment in the workplace . The
1
enormous financial liability for an employer is only part of the concern. Sexual
harassment and its aftermath may contribute to decreased worker productivity,
2
increased employee turnover, and lower workplace morale. Workers suffering
trauma from harassment take more time off from work than the average employee, subjecting employers to increased business costs from medical insur3
ance. Sexual harassment may affect employee concentration and lead to in* Allan H. Weitzman is the head of the Labor and Employment Law Department in the Boca
Raton office of Proskauer Rose LLP. Representing management exclusively, his practice focuses on
employment litigation (discrimination, wrongful termination, etc.) and employment law counseling
on a crisis and day-to-day basis. Mr. Weitzman is a recognized national speaker on employment
law topics. In addition, he is Editor-in-Chief of HR Advisor—Legal & Practical Guidance and a regular
Corporate Brief columnist for The National Law Journal. Contributions to this article were made by
Robyn J. Greenberg, Georgetown University Law Center 1999; Gayle M. Farbman, New York University School of Law 1999; and Heather Pearson, Harvard School of Law 1999. Josh Frank, an associate in Proskauer’s Boca Raton office, also assisted in the final preparation of this article.
1. One study estimated that an average large American company from the Fortune 500 may
spend as much as $6.7 million a year on sexual harassment, while another study estimated that sexual harassment cost the federal government $267 million over two years. Sara N. Kline, Sexual Harassment, Wrongful Discharge, and Employer Liability: The Employer’s Dilemma, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 191
(1993) (citing U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:
AN UPDATE 39 (1988)). An example of the possible legal costs of sexual harassment is the 1993 action against the law firm of Baker & McKenzie. The court initially awarded $6.9 million to a legal
secretary who had been repeatedly harassed, but the award was subsequently reduced to $3.5 million—still a large blow to any business. Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, No. 943043, 1994 WL 774633,
at *4 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Nov. 28, 1994). Another example of the potential legal costs of harassment is the 1997 settlement between Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America Inc. and
twenty-seven female employees. Amy Goldstein and Barbara Vobjeda, Companies, Courts Differ in
Defining Harassment, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 1998, at A16. The $10 million dollar settlement does not
include the consequences of a subsequent claim by women from Mitsubishi’s Normal, Illinois plant
that was settled on June 12, 1998, by the EEOC for $34 million dollars. Barnaby J. Feder, $34 Million
Settles Suit For Women at Auto Plant, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1998, at A12. The settlement, if approved
by the court, will be the largest sexual harassment settlement to date negotiated by the federal government, and will include additional remedies such as a mandatory sexual harassment training, revision of current sexual harassment policies, and investigation of all sexual harassment complaints
within three weeks. Paula Lyon, For the Record, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS., Sept. 7, 1998, at 30.
2. STEPHEN MOREWITZ, SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 160161 (1996) (stating that studies show sexual harassment experiences negatively effect workers).
3. See id. at 162.
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creased accidents at work and frequent mistakes, contributing to a lower quality
4
work product. Additionally, decreased motivation resulting from the deteriorated relationship with a supervisor may result in lower workplace productivity
and a decline in the quality of employee performance, ultimately resulting in de5
creased profitability for an employer. Job turnover resulting from harassment
costs the employer in terms of recruiting and training of new employees; additionally, there is the temporal cost attributed to rebuilding successful business
6
relationships. Ultimately, these costs are then passed on to consumers and citi7
zens through increased prices and taxes.
Beyond this, statistics suggest that sexual harassment in the workplace is so
pervasive that no employer can hide its head in the sand any longer. According
to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 6,883 sexual harassment complaints were filed with the EEOC in 1991, rising to 10,532 com8
plaints in 1992, then to 11,908 complaints in 1993 and 15,618 complaints in 1998.
Although many claims are filed, not every claim of sexual harassment is meritorious. As an attorney exclusively representing management, I must remain current on the tools available to defend against sexual harassment claims that are
lacking in either merit or legal support.
This paper focuses on the legal defenses that management advocates use to
defeat sexual harassment claims for which an employer should not be held responsible. I would be remiss, however, if I did not emphasize that in my opinion the best possible practical defense is to train supervisors and managers to
9
prevent meritorious claims from ever being filed. Training programs serve the
dual purpose of fostering a workplace environment that is free of harassment
and providing a legal basis to defend a sexual harassment claim. For instance,
courts have determined in some situations that training helps an employer to
10
11
avoid liability or facilitate the shifting of burdens in a discrimination case. The
absence of training may also provide weight for the plaintiff’s claim that the em12
ployer has not exercised reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment. Lastly, a
4. See id. at 160-161 (stating that surveys show that sexual harassment experiences lead to a
decrease in the quantity and quality of work).
5. See id.
6. See id. at 162.
7. See id. at 161 (showing that surveys say that sexual harassment cost the federal government
$267 million during a two year period).
8. EEOC, Sexual Harassment Charges (last modified Nov. 9, 1998) <http://www.eeoc.gov/
stats/harass.html>.
9. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) 1998.
10. See Balletti v. Sun-Sentinel Co., 909 F. Supp. 1539 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (holding that the company
provided sufficient sexual harassment training to defeat a claim that the employer failed to take remedial action following complaints). See also John A. Barnes, Does “Diversity” Help Business?,
INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, May 17, 1995, at A1, (“If a company or government agency gets sued, a diversity training program is a great thing to be able to point to in court as evidence of racial or ethnic
sensitivity.”).
11. See Parrish v. AllState Ins. Co., 46 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that evidence of harassment training and legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for firing shifted burden back to plaintiff to
raise a genuine issue of material fact).
12. See Booker v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., No. 3: 94-0048, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12962, at *34
(M.D. Tenn. July 10, 1998) (absence of training was a factor contributing to the court’s conclusion
that the employer had not exercised reasonable care to prevent sexual harassment).
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court may require an employer found liable for sexual harassment in the work13
place to implement a training program as a remedy. In the end, the potential
14
15
benefits of training substantially outweigh the risks.
Training, however, is not bulletproof protection. Even where there has
been training, some supervisors will ignore or misunderstand the messages, and
claims will be filed. At that point, the legal defenses discussed below become
important. For organizational purposes, the defenses to sexual harassment
claims will be analyzed in three different categories: (i) general employer defenses to claims of sexual harassment; (ii) unique defenses to quid pro quo and
hostile environment harassment; and (iii) several yet to be tested defenses to
sexual harassment from the latest in employment law theory and jurisprudence.
II. GENERAL EMPLOYER DEFENSES TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT
‘General employer defenses’ to sexual harassment are those defenses that
are applicable to both quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual har16
assment. These defenses include, but are not limited to: (i) “it didn’t happen”,

13. See Stair v. Lehigh Valley Carpenters Local Union No. 600, 855 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(requiring union found liable for hostile work environment sexual harassment to implement mandatory annual training program for all local members); see also EEOC v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 909 F.
Supp. 1529 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (requiring yearly training of all managers on harassment and retaliation
policy), affd without op., 113 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 687 (1998).
14. Benefits of sexual harassment and sensitivity seminars include: increased awareness of
rights and obligations, see Jennifer J. Laabs, Sexual Harassment, 74 PERSONNEL J., Feb. 1, 1995, at 36
(arguing that although the number of complaints may increase immediately after a training session,
management representatives often “would like to have [their] employees aware of their rights and
talking about them with [the employer] rather than going outside to talk about it”); improved business reputation, id. (“When you combine a strong policy, regular training and a detailed and timely
investigation procedure into your sexual harassment strategy, experts agree that you may have a
fighting chance limiting your liability and increasing your reputation of good faith and fair dealing
with your work force.”); and increased employee morale, see Carol Malis, Taking Time for Training:
Seminars Teach Tolerance, Diversity, CRAIN’S DET. BUS., Jan. 2, 1995, at 8 (“[T]raining sessions are important . . . because people are going to have a happier work environment. It will keep up morale if
employees are treated in a positive and respectful way.”).
15. Possible risks of training include: manager retaliation, see Fitzgerald v. Mountain States Tel.
& Tel. Co., 68 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 1995) (involving instance where manager discriminated based on
what an employee said in a training session); Susan L. Smith, Diversity Training, A Workshop Goes
Awry, KAN. LAW EMPLOYMENT LETTER, June 1995, at 3 (“Highly intense diversity workshops pose
risks to the employer . . . . Objectionable language or conduct may occur; employees may become
angry, or defensive, or have their feelings hurt; and previously unknown and unresolved prejudices
can lead to discrimination suits.”); manager’s comments as evidence of discrimination, see Stender v.
Lucky Stores, 803 F. Supp. 259 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that statements made by store managers
during sensitivity training were admissible as evidence of discriminatory intent within the organization); see also Stuart Silverstein, Workplace Diversity Efforts Thrive Despite Backlash, L.A. TIMES, May 2,
1995, at A1 (“While the sessions supposedly had the noble aim of uncovering the managers’ biases,
they instead helped get the company into trouble.”); and inappropriate actions in training leading to
lawsuits, see Hartman v. Pena, 914 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (simulating and role-playing in a cultural diversity seminar created a hostile work environment sufficient to establish prima facie case);
see also Joyce Price, FAA’s Gantlet [sic] Exercise Assailed by Diversity Trainers, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 11,
1994, at A1 (activities at issue in Hartman v. Pena were outside of the norm).
16. Quid pro quo harassment occurs when the submission to a request for sexual favors is
linked to an economic or other job benefit. Hostile work environment harassment occurs when
conduct creates a hostile or offensive environment or otherwise interferes with an individual’s work
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(ii) welcomeness, (iii) the conduct was not sexual or was not based on sex, (iv)
the First Amendment; and (e) the ‘equal opportunity harasser.’
A. “It Didn’t Happen”
The most basic and obvious argument that an employer can make in re17
sponse to a claim of sexual harassment is that it just didn’t happen. The veracity of the plaintiff’s assertions can always be challenged, as in any other litigation, to weed out false or exaggerated claims. To demonstrate that harassment
actually took place, courts will permit expert testimony as to whether the plaintiff has reacted in a manner consistent with one who has suffered from sexual
18
harassment. However, the last thing an employer wants to do is to go to a jury
on a factual dispute over “he said” versus “she said.” In these circumstances,
even if there was no sexual harassment, a jury may resolve the conflicting testi19
mony against the party with the ‘deep pockets.’ Therefore, it is imperative that
employers analyze all available defenses to a claim of sexual harassment to ensure the strongest defense possible.
B. Welcomeness
A second defense available to employers in both hostile work environment
and quid pro quo cases is that the conduct complained of was welcomed by the
plaintiff. No matter how offensive sexual conduct in the workplace may be, an
employer is not liable if the conduct is consented to or welcomed. In Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Supreme Court held that to successfully establish a
claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he or she was the subject of unwelcome advances, (2) the unwelcome conduct was based on sex, (3) the unwelcome conduct affected a term,
condition or privilege of employment, and (4) the conduct should be imputed to
20
the employer. The definition of welcomeness endorsed by the EEOC is that the
conduct must be unwelcome “in the sense that the employee did not solicit or
incite it, and in the sense that the employee regarded the conduct as undesirable
21
or offensive.” It is not enough that the plaintiff believed the conduct to be distasteful; it must be demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the
plaintiff by his or her own conduct indicated that the complained of behavior
22
was in fact unwelcome. To determine whether the conduct was unwelcome, a
court may consider the following: whether the plaintiff willingly participated in
performance. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1998).
17. See, e.g., McLean v. Satellite Tech. Servs. Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1458 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (including a
defense by the alleged harasser that no sexual overture took place).
18. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1505-06 (M.D. Fla.
1991) (allowing the testimony of a consultant in the area of women in work to provide insight into
how the company’s work environment was conducive to sexual harassment of the female employer).
19. This is based on the author’s experiences in this field.
20. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
21. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) P3114 (Mar. 19, 1990) (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682
F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982)).
22. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68.
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the very conduct about which he or she now complains, whether the plaintiff
clearly made her supervisors aware that in the future such conduct would be
considered unwelcome, and the period of time that elapsed between the occur23
rence of the conduct and the plaintiff’s complaints about it.
The analysis of a sexual harassment claim based on unwelcomeness can be
aided by categorizing the potential plaintiff’s responses to unwelcome sexual
24
25
advances. The victim of the harassment may respond with outright rejection,
26
initial rejection and later acceptance, initial acceptance followed by later rejec27
28
tion or ‘soured romance’, or coerced submission. Coerced submission can be
29
30
further categorized into situations where the duress is physical or economic.
Furthermore, because coercion to participate in or accept sexual advances need

23. See, e.g., Balletti v. Sun-Sentinel Co., 909 F. Supp. 1539, 1546-47 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (allowing
court to consider whether plaintiff willingly participated in the activity she complains of); Weinsheimer v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 745 F. Supp. 1559, 1564 (M.D. Fla. 1990), affd without op., 949 F.2d
1162 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding when plaintiff did not report offensive incident until months after it
occurred and made “active contribution to the sexually explicit environment” of the workplace, she
did not find the behavior truly unwelcome or hostile); Perkins v. General Motors Corp., 709 F. Supp.
1487, 1499 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (holding that a court may determine whether behavior was unwelcome
by looking to plaintiff’s own conduct, plaintiff’s contribution to the atmosphere through her own
“profane and sexually suggestive conduct,” when and if plaintiff reported conduct, and whether
plaintiff made it clear to co-workers or supervisors that such conduct would be considered offensive
in the future).
24. See generally BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT
LAW, 53-74 (1992).
25. See, e.g., Jones v. Wesco Invest., Inc., 846 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that unwelcomeness was sufficiently demonstrated by plaintiff by pushing away her supervisor, stating that
she was only interested in a business relationship, and leaving the room); Sparks v. Pilot Freight
Carriers Inc., 830 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that unwelcome sexual advance followed by
denial of tangible benefits was sufficient to survive summary judgment in both hostile work environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment claims).
26. See, e.g., Trautvetter v. Quick, 916 F.2d 1140, 1149 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that the record
“appears to substantiate the district court’s findings that Ms. Trautvetter grew to ‘welcome’ [the]
advances and even participated in an active way so as to encourage them”).
27. Often adverse employment action in these cases stems from personal circumstances rather
than the gender of the alleged victim of sexual harassment. See Keppler v. Hinsdale Township High
Sch. Dist., 715 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (discussing variations in “soured romance” situations
and determining that new, unwelcome advances following the end of a relationship is sufficient
grounds for a sexual harassment claim). See also LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 24, at 136-137,
172-173 (“[T]he complainant’s prior consent is not a defense to a claim of later harassment . . .
[c]onduct that is initially welcome may become unwelcome. A complainant in that situation has
waived no rights by initially accepting the behavior, but has complicated any attempt to prove unwelcomeness.”).
28. See, e.g., Chamberlin v. 101 Realty Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 784 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that welcomeness determination must include consideration of whether plaintiff “reasonably perceives” that
protest will facilitate termination); Babcock v. Frank, 729 F. Supp. 279, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (alleging
that coercion resulted from job-related threats by supervisor and subsequent sexual conduct was not
consensual).
29. See, e.g., Gilardi v. Schroeder, 672 F. Supp. 1043 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding that sexual advances were clearly unwelcome where plaintiff was drugged and then raped), affd, 833 F.2d 122
(7th Cir. 1987).
30. See, e.g., Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Serv., Inc., 711 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding
that lower court was correct to consider that alleged harasser knew plaintiff needed job to make
house payments and exploited her financial need to solicit sexual relations).
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not be explicit, implicit duress may also be sufficient to demonstrate that the
31
conduct was unwelcome. Finally, when coercion of any sort is alleged, it is es32
sential to remember that voluntary participation and a failure to protest are not
33
always indicative of welcomeness.
Proof of unwelcomeness is a question of fact to be determined in light of all
circumstances surrounding the conduct, and it is not necessarily precluded by
34
participation in sexual banter. Where the employee voluntarily entered into a
consensual relationship with the alleged harasser without coercion, an employer
35
will generally be entitled to a favorable judgment. Where, however, the relationship is not consensual or where advances were rejected, the conduct will be
held to be unwelcome and an employer will not avoid liability by using this de36
fense.
31. See Thoreson v. Penthouse Int’l, 149 Misc. 2d 150, 563 N.Y.S.2d 968, 975-76 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
Co. 1990) (holding that implicit coercion is equivalent to explicit coercion in analyzing a sexual harassment claim), aff’d 80, N.Y.2d 490 (1992).
32. “Evidence of plaintiff’s participation in the conduct is not determinative, but it may suggest
that the conduct was welcome. However, participation may be viewed as a response linked to the
plaintiff’s fear of losing her job.” ALBA CONTE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: LAW AND
PRACTICE 334-35 (1994) (citations omitted). See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68
(1986) (stating that appropriate inquiry for welcomeness “is whether [complainant] by her conduct
indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether her actual participation in
sexual intercourse was voluntary”); Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ga.
1983) (holding that summary judgment is not appropriate for the employer even though plaintiff
voluntarily submitted to sexual advances where plaintiff alleges she submitted due to intimidation).
33. See, e.g., Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding inter alia that plaintiff
need not demonstrate resistance to the alleged sexual harassment).
34. See Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 1987) (“[U]se of foul language or sexual innuendo in a consensual setting does not waive ‘[a plaintiff’s] legal protections against unwelcome harassment.’” (quoting Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254, n.3 (4th Cir. 1983))).
35. See, e.g., Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 486-87, 492 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that plaintiff, a
civilian jail employee who was often handcuffed to furniture or doors, subjected to suggestive remarks and conversations involving oral sex, and forcefully placed on male employees’ laps had no
actionable sexual harassment claim because she participated willingly in the “sexual hogans” and
reciprocated in kind); Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 687 F. Supp. 848, 861-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(stating that plaintiff’s allegations that bank president who caused her to be denied salary increases,
transferred, and ultimately terminated upon cessation of their sexual relationship were dismissed
because there was no demonstration that the relationship was not consensual); Jensen v. Kellings
Fine Foods, Inc., 51 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1752, 1760 (D. Kan. 1987) (holding that plaintiff
who had been terminated by her supervisor and his wife, both of whom were stockholders in the
company, upon discovery of her affair with the supervisor had no action based on sexual harassment because the relationship was consensual).
36. See, e.g., Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Div. Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 1007, 1011-1012 (7th
Cir. 1994) (reversing a dismissal of plaintiff’s claims based on plaintiff’s participation in rowdy behavior in a tinsmith shop because plaintiff’s words and conduct was not comparable to the men’s
and plaintiff, the first woman to work in the shop, was subjected to a daily barrage of sexually harassing comments and pranks); Showalter v. Allison Reed Group, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 1205, 1211 (D.R.I.
1991) (holding that male plaintiff who was forced to observe and engage in sexual activity with his
supervisor’s secretary on a regular basis after plaintiff’s supervisor threatened to terminate his job
and/or medical benefits had an actionable claim despite the fact that he “willingly contributed to
the environment of sexual innuendo” by making proposals of his own because his express rejections
of initial invitations were sufficient to demonstrate unwelcomeness), sub nom. Phetosomphor v. Allison Reed Group, Inc., aff’d, 984 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1993); Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 1280
(D.D.C. 1988) (“[C]onsensual sexual relations, in exchange for tangible employment benefits, while
possibly not creating a cause of action for the recipient of such sexual advances who does not find
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Verbal indications that the plaintiff did not welcome the advances may not
37
always be sufficient to support a sexual harassment claim. For example, in
38
Trautvetter v. Quick, the Seventh Circuit found that, when viewed in the totality
of the circumstances, the complained of behavior was welcome despite the fact
that the plaintiff “initially declined [the alleged harasser’s] offer for drinks,
39
etc.” In that case, a teacher who had a consensual sexual relationship with the
principal of the school in which she taught brought suit alleging various claims,
40
including a section 1983 equal protection claim, which the court analyzed using
41
42
the contours of a Title VII sexual harassment claim. The district court determined that the plaintiff had not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the principal’s advances were unwelcome, stating that “[t]he fact that
[Mrs. Trautvetter] sometimes said no to [Mr. Quick’s] suggestions or made excuses not to meet him does not imply that she did not welcome his advances, especially when she often did agree to meet him and participated actively in the
43
relationship.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision, agreeing that the
conduct appeared welcome, observing that
[b]eyond the fact that [the plaintiff] initially declined [the principal’s] offer for
drinks, etc., the record is void of any evidence showing that she declared those
advances to be unwelcome. Much to the contrary, the course of conduct when
reviewed in its entirety, appears to substantiate the district court’s findings that
[the plaintiff] grew to ‘welcome’ [the principal’s] advances and even partici44
pated in an active way so as to encourage them.

Thus, evidence of verbal indications of unwelcomeness, when viewed in conjunction with other factors, may not be enough to support a claim of sexual harassment.
Nevertheless, welcomeness remains an important inquiry. Under Meritor,
the correct inquiry as to welcomeness is whether the plaintiff indicated through

them unwelcome, do, and in this case did, create and contribute to a sexually hostile working environment.”).
37. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986).
38. Trautvetter v. Quick, 916 F.2d 1140, 1144 (7th Cir. 1990).
39. Id. at 1149.
40. 42 U.S.C.  1983 states in material part that “every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory of the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1998).
41. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an “unlawful employment practice for an
employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
Though courts generally follow the contours of Title VII for 42 U.S.C.  1983 claims, one important
distinction between the two is that in 42 U.S.C.  1983 claims, plaintiff must prove an intent to discriminate. In Title VII cases, there is no such intent requirement. See Trautvetter, 916 F.2d at 1149;
see also King v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990).
42. Trautvetter, 916 F.2d at 1148-54.
43. See id. at 1149.
44. Id.
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his or her conduct that the “alleged sexual advances were unwelcomed.” Of
course, it is always possible that the alleged victim welcomed any complained of
46
advances or conduct. Courts have looked to various factors as indicators of
consent, participation, and welcomeness of sexual advances. Factors that may
be interpreted as indicative of welcomeness range from sexually provocative
47
48
speech or dress to the giving of an expensive gift. In addition, welcomeness
may be demonstrated by showing that the plaintiff participated in or encour49
aged the complained of conduct. Furthermore, an employer may rely on evi50
dence of prior sexual history to demonstrate welcomeness.
In order to use evidence of prior sexual history to demonstrate welcomeness some hurdles must be overcome. As an initial matter, the discoverability of
51
this type of evidence is regulated by Federal Rule of Evidence 412. The rule
45. 477 U.S. 57, 68.
46. See, e.g., Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat’l Management Co., 805 F.2d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 1986)
(holding that both plaintiff’s attitude and her failure to report a second incident for three months
demonstrated plaintiff was not offended by the incidents); Reichman v. Bureau of Affirmative Action, 536 F. Supp. 1149 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that plaintiff’s initiation of a sexual relationship
with her supervisor demonstrated that it was welcome).
47. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986); Jones v. Wesco Invest., Inc., 846
F.2d 1154, 1155 n. 4 (8th Cir. 1988) (“[C]ourt must consider any provocative speech or dress of the
plaintiff in a sexual harassment case.”); see also McLean v. Satellite Tech. Servs., Inc., 673 F. Supp.
1458, 1459-1450 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (using plaintiff’s past behavior, including an instance in which she
lifted her dress to show the alleged harasser that she was not wearing any undergarments, to indicate that any sexual advances that defendant made were not unwelcome).
48. See Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 49 F.3d 466, 473 (8th Cir. 1995). The Eighth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s granting of summary judgment for the employer on the plaintiffemployee’s quid pro quo claim which alleged sexual harassment and retaliatory termination. The
court found, in part, that the conduct was not unwelcome because the foreman accused of harassment “did not make any sexual comments, advances or requests after their consensual relationship
ended, and [the plaintiff] gave him an expensive Valentine’s Day gift which indicates that whatever
nonsexual advances he made were not unwelcome.” Id. at 468-70.
49. See, e.g., Smith v. Acme Spinning Co., No. C-C-85-066-M, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27059, at *5
(W.D.N.C. Apr. 8, 1986) (rejecting unwelcomeness claim where plaintiff “frequently participated in
on-the-job horseplay that included a good deal of rubbing and touching of male employees” and
holding that evidence of prior sexual history is relevant as to question of whether plaintiff was aggressor); Gan v. Kepro Circuit Sys., Inc., 28 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 639, 640-641 (E.D. Mo. 1982)
(holding admissible as evidence of welcomeness that plaintiff used crude and vulgar language, initiated sexually explicit conversations with male co-workers, asked others about sexual relationships,
divulged voluntarily information about her own sexual relationships, pinched a male co-worker on
the buttocks, participated in workplace “horseplay,” and ate lunch with male co-workers).
50. See, e.g., Swentek v. USAir, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 556 (4th Cir. 1987) (permitting the use of testimony that described plaintiff’s prior sexual history in the workplace, which included sexual
propositions of co-workers, to demonstrate welcomeness in a sexual harassment case). Cf. Priest v.
Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755, 758 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (holding that discovery into plaintiff’s prior sexual conduct was inadmissible to demonstrate a propensity to engage in similar sexual conduct).
51. Federal Rule of Evidence 412 provides:
(a) Evidence [is] generally inadmissible. The following evidence is not admissible in any
civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct except as provided in
subdivisions (b) and (c):
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior.
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim’s sexual predisposition.
(b) Exceptions.
...
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limits use of prior sexual history but permits broad discretion at the trial court
52
level with respect to relevance and admissibility of this type of evidence. This
rule facilitates participation in a legal proceeding by preventing public disclo53
sure of details that may result in embarrassment and sexual stereotyping.
In a ruling on discovery, one court wrote: “Courts should presumptively issue protective orders barring discovery unless the party seeking discovery
makes a showing that the evidence sought to be discovered would be relevant
under the facts and theories of the particular case and cannot be obtained except
54
through discovery.” Thus, defense lawyers seeking to delve into a plaintiff’s
prior sexual conduct will have to show both relevance and need before they will
be allowed discovery on such matters. Conduct outside of the workplace or
conduct not known to the other party at the time of the alleged harassment is
55
generally not admissible. On the other hand, evidence that pertains to a victim’s workplace behavior will generally be deemed relevant, and thus admissi56
ble, sometimes with a protective order or confidentiality agreement. Once evidence of prior sexual history is admitted, it may be used to determine both what
conduct the plaintiff found unwelcome and what conduct the alleged harasser
57
believed was welcome. Clearly, sufficient evidence of welcomeness will not be
available in every case of sexual harassment. Thus, it may be necessary for em-

(2) In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or sexual predisposition
of any alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise admissible under these rules and its
probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair
prejudice to any party. Evidence of an alleged victim’s reputation is admissible only if it
has been placed in controversy by the alleged victim.
See, e.g., Herchenroeder v. Johns Hopkins Univ. Applied Physics Lab., 171 F.R.D. 179, 182 (D. Md.
1997) (stating that “[I]n determining whether the requested discovery in [a sexual harassment case]
is appropriate, I must look to both FED. R. CIV. P. 26 and FED. R. EVID. 412”); Sanchez v. Zabihi, 166
F.R.D. 500, 501-502 (D.N.M. 1996) (holding that FED. R. EVID. 412 is significant in resolving discovery disputes in sexual harassment cases regarding the victims’ past behavior in the workplace);
Barta v. City and County of Honolulu, 169 F.R.D. 132, 135 (D. Haw. 1996) (stating that in sexual
harassment cases FED. R. EVID. 412 “inform[s] the proper scope of discovery”).
52. See Barta, 169 F.R.D. at 135.
53. FED. R. EVID. 412 ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES (amended 1994).
54. Barta, 169 F.R.D. at 135; see also Mitchell v. Hutchings, 116 F.R.D. 481, 484 (D. Utah 1987)
(holding that evidence as to plaintiff’s sexual activity was not discoverable as defendant was not
aware of it at the time of the alleged harassment).
55. See, e.g., Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 963 (8th Cir. 1993) (“A Title VII
plaintiff’s behavior at work, if provocative and suggestive, may be relevant to the employer’s defense, but conduct in her private life unrelated to work is not [relevant]”); Herchenroeder, 171 F.R.D.
at 182, n.11 (describing how holding in Burns relates to present facts); Stalnaker v. Kmart Corp., 71
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 705, 707 (D. Kan. 1996) (“[N]on-work place conduct [of the victim] will
usually be irrelevant . . . . Any sexual harassment by [the defendant] is relevant, however, whether
of plaintiff or of others”); Barta, 169 F.R.D. at 136 (holding that defendants are not necessarily permitted by FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) to inquire into plaintiff’s sexual conduct “while she was off duty,
outside the workplace and which did not involve conduct with the defendants”); Sanchez, 166 F.R.D.
at 501 (holding that FED. R. EVID. 412 establishes a presumption of inadmissibility of evidence of
past sexual behavior).
56. See Herchenroeder, 171 F.R.D. at 182 (protective order granted where plaintiff’s sexual conduct at work relevant to claim of sexual harassment).
57. See Weiss v. Amoco Oil Co., 142 F.R.D. 311, 316 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (stating that discovery of
plaintiff’s prior sexual conduct may explain the context of the defendant’s words and actions).
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ployers to turn to another defense.
C. Conduct Was Not Sexual Conduct or Was Not Based On Sex
Under Title VII, a plaintiff alleging sexual harassment must prove “but for”
causation; i.e., that the plaintiff would not have suffered sexual harassment had
58
he or she been of a different gender. According to EEOC Guidelines, a claim of
sexual harassment requires that the unwelcome conduct include “sexual ad59
vances . . . and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature.” This requirement, however, is both under and over-inclusive: under-inclusive because
it would not reach nonsexual gender based harassment, and over-inclusive because it would include all offensive sexual conduct, even if it is not gender
60
based. To clarify this potentially misleading language, the EEOC has stated:
Although the Guidelines specifically address conduct that is sexual in nature,
the Commission notes that sex-based harassment—that is, harassment not involving sexual activity or language—may also give rise to Title VII liability (just
as in the case of harassment based on race, national origin or religion) if it is
“sufficiently patterned or pervasive” and directed at employees because of their
61
sex.

Thus, conduct need not be sexual to be considered sexual harassment.
However, the less that the alleged conduct is actually sex based, the less likely a
court is to interpret the harassment as “based on sex” and therefore in violation
62
of Title VII.
Traditionally, courts have considered that sexual allegations in sexual harassment cases are inherently gender based, and therefore under the purview of
63
Title VII. However, as previously mentioned, plaintiffs in Title VII actions

58. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981). A distinction is made between
harassment based on sex and harassment based on sexual orientation. As has already been stated,
harassment based on sex is proven by showing “but for” causation, and is actionable under Title
VII. Id. Harassment based on sexual orientation, however, is not actionable under Title VII because
“but for” causation cannot be proven. See generally Brennan v. Metropolitan Opera Ass’n, 95 Civ.
2926, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5562, at *40 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 1998) (where plaintiff could not substantiate her claims that defendant’s homosexual comments created a hostile work environment towards
females because the lewd comments were not directed to females but to males).
59. 29 C.F.R.  1604.11(a) (1998).
60. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 24, at 173.
61. EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT, 405:6692. See, e.g., McKinney v. Dole, 765
F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that gender based conduct sufficiently offensive, severe,
and pervasive to maintain a claim need not be sexual in nature).
62. See, e.g., Seligson v. Massachusetts Inst. of Tech., 677 F. Supp. 648 (D. Mass. 1987).
63. See, e.g., Farpella-Crosby v. Horizon Health Care, 97 F.3d 803, 806 n.2 (5th Cir. 1996)
(stating that the fact that the defendant allegedly asked about the plaintiff’s sexual activity or made
other offensive comments was “unquestionably based on gender”); Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503,
511 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[S]exual harassment is ordinarily based on sex. What else could it be based
on?”); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990) (“The intent to discriminate on the basis of sex in cases involving sexual propositions, innuendo, pornographic materials, or sexual[ly] derogatory language is implicit, and thus should be recognized as a matter of
course.”); King v. Board of Regents, 898 F.2d 533, 538 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the male defendant’s
argument that his sexual overtures to the female plaintiff were not gender based because they “were
merely the result of his desire for [her] as an individual and, therefore, were not sex-based harass-
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must prove “but for” causation. In Henson v. City of Dundee, the Eleventh Circuit
stated:
In the typical case in which a male supervisor makes sexual overtures to a female worker, it is obvious that the supervisor did not treat male employees in a
similar fashion. It will therefore be a [simple] matter for the plaintiff to prove
64
that but for her sex, she would not have been subjected to sexual harassment.

Following that enunciation, other courts have relied on and applied the
65
“but for” test of causation. For instance, relying on a lack of “but for” causation, a court may find that an individual was not harassed because of sex, but
66
because of sexual orientation, and therefore dismiss the Title VII claim. In addition, some courts have held that sexual harassment was not actionable due to a
lack of causation because it was attributable to other factors besides sex, includ67
68
69
70
ing mental state, sexual affiliations, transsexualism, and personal dislike.
One way to demonstrate “but for” causation is through comparison to other

ment”).
64. Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934,
942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
65. See, e.g., Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1537 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying the
“but for” test, the court stated that “[I]f the nature of an employee’s environment, however unpleasant, is not due to her gender, she has not been the victim of sex discrimination. . . .”) (citations and
quotations omitted); Jones v. Flagship Int’l, 793 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1065 (1987) (applying “but for sex” test); Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 784 (1st Cir.
1990) (applying the “but for sex” test); Stewart v. Weis Markets, 890 F. Supp. 382, 390 (M.D. Pa.
1995) (applying the “but for sex” test), affd sub nom., Stewart v. Botsford, No. 95-7415 and 94-7435,
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 14998 (3d Cir. May 7, 1996).
66. See, e.g., Wehrle v. Office Depot, 954 F. Supp 234, 236 (W.D. Okla. 1996); Johnson v. Community Nursing Servs., 932 F. Supp 269, 273 (D. Utah 1996). Both cases cite the EEOC Compliance
Manual, which interprets Title VII as not proscribing discrimination and harassment motivated by
the plaintiff’s sexual orientation. 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH)  615.2. See, e.g., Swage v. Inn Philadelphia, No. 96-2380, 1996 WL 368316, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 1996) (holding that harassment by a
homosexual against a homosexual may be based on sexual orientation); Vandeventer v. Wabash
Nat’l Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1180 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (holding, on reconsideration, that sexual harassment is only actionable because it is a form of gender discrimination; discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation is not actionable); Shermer v. Illinois DOT, 937 F. Supp. 781, 784 (C.D. Ill. 1996)
(“[A]ll the evidence suggests [that] Plaintiff was harassed not because of his sexual gender but because of his sexual orientation.”).
67. See, e.g., Galloway v. G.M. Servs. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1167-68 (7th Cir. 1996)
(finding no merit in sexual harassment claim based on co-worker’s comments that plaintiff was a
“sick bitch”).
68. See, e.g., DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 306-07 (2d Cir. 1986)
(holding that males were not prejudiced because of sex but because of their supervisor’s preference
for someone with whom he had a relationship and that “[T]he proscribed differentiation under Title
VII . . . must be a distinction based on a person’s sex, not on his or her sexual affiliations.”), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 825 (1987).
69. See, e.g, Blackwell v. United States Dep’t of Treasury, 830 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(holding failure to hire a transvestite is not actionable under Rehabilitation Act); Sommers v. Iowa
Civil Rights Comm’n, 337 N.W.2d 470, 476-77 (Iowa 1983) (holding that transvestitism is not actionable under state human rights statute).
70. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hondo, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1403, 1411 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (“[P]ersonality
conflicts between employees are not the business of the federal courts.”), affd., 125 F.3d 408 (7th Cir.
1997).
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employees who are not in the protected class but who are similarly situated. A
plaintiff may be able to establish an inference of discrimination in a termination
or other discipline case by establishing that similarly situated individuals not in
72
the protected class were treated differently. To sustain a claim on this basis,
plaintiffs must do more than rely on conclusory statements because “sweeping
allegations unsupported by admissible evidence do not raise a genuine issue of
73
material fact.” Even if the conduct is sexual in nature, where a plaintiff cannot
prove “but for” causation, an employer should be able to prevail in a sexual harassment case.
D. First Amendment
The First Amendment provides another theoretical defense for employers.
Using this defense, a defendant would argue that his allegedly harassing speech
is not punishable because of his First Amendment right to free expression. Because sexual harassment claims are often based on verbal or expressive conduct,
74
First Amendment rights frequently come into play. The tension arises between
the right to be free from gender-based discrimination in the workplace, and the
75
right of free expression that exists in the workplace, as elsewhere. In short,
workplace expression that is protected speech must be sifted out from work76
place expression that is prohibited harassment.
The First Amendment is relevant to both claims of quid pro quo harassment
and hostile work environment harassment, as expression is central to both forms
of sexual harassment. In quid pro quo claims expression takes the form of demands for sexual favors. In contrast, the expression in a hostile work environ77
ment is the conduct itself. In quid pro quo cases, First Amendment tensions are
less prevalent, however, because the First Amendment generally does not pro78
tect threats or extortion. Thus, to the extent that courts recognize the First

71. See Shumway v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 118 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1997). The Second Circuit
has held, “[T]o be ‘similarly situated,’ the individuals with whom [plaintiff] attempts to compare
herself must be similarly situated in all material respects.” Id. at 64 (citation omitted).
72. See id. at 64 (finding a lack of causation given that the claims of male employees who alleged violations of a “no fraternization” policy were treated no differently than those of the plaintiff).
73. Id. at 65.
74. Although the First Amendment directly constrains only government actions, and not those
of private sector employers, a private employer is considered to act as a government agent when he
restricts employees’ speech to comply with government mandates such as Title VII and the EEOC
Regulations. See Nadine Strossen, The Kenneth M. Piper Lecture: The Tensions Between Regulating
Workplace Harassment and the First Amendment: No Trump, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 701, 707-708 (1995).
75. Id. at 701-702. See generally Nadine Strossen, The American Civil Liberties Union and Women’s
Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940 (1991) (discussing the ACLU’s history of working in support of
women’s rights, including its Women’s Rights Project and Reproductive Freedom Project).
76. See Strossen, supra note 74, at 702-703.
77. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 24, at 592; id. at 704.
78. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 24, at 593. See also DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police
Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 597 n.6 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 974 (1995) (clarifying that in
raising the First Amendment issue in the sexual harassment context, the court “[did] not mean that
sexual propositions, quid pro quo overtures, discriminatory employment actions against women or
‘fighting words’ involve the First Amendment”).
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Amendment as a valid defense, it will usually only be available in the context of
a hostile environment claim so that words or conduct that are protected outside
the workplace setting may remain protected even if they create a hostile envi79
ronment.
80
In practice, however, the defense is seldom used. The 1991 federal district
court decision, Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, was the first reported Title VII
81
case in which a First Amendment defense was asserted and ruled upon. Although the defendants did not expressly articulate a First Amendment defense,
they explained that their failure to respond to the plaintiff’s complaints of sexual
harassment resulted from their belief that the plaintiff’s co-workers had consti82
tutional rights to behave in the manner that they did.
In finding that “[sexually explicit] pictures and verbal harassment are not
protected speech because they act as discriminatory conduct in the form of a
83
hostile work environment,” the court categorized the restriction of such expres84
sion as “nothing more than a time, place, and manner regulation of speech.”
The court also found that the governmental interest in “cleansing the workplace
of impediments to the equality of women” was a compelling interest that permitted regulation of such workplace expression, and that the regulation was
85
narrowly drawn to serve that interest.
Although courts since Robinson have frequently acknowledged that First
Amendment issues are likely to arise in cases involving sexual harassment, they
86
have seldom addressed the validity of this defense. Nevertheless, a few cases

See Strossen, supra note 74, at 705 n.15 (citing KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INCOMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH, 80 (1995)). See also Note, Aileen v. Kent, First
Amendment Defense to Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: Does Discriminatory Conduct Deserve
Constitutional Protection?, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 513, 532 (1994) (“[T]he use of the First Amendment to
protect sexual harassment perpetrators will have a negative impact on the victims of sexual harassment and the workforce in general.”).
80. See Wayne Lindsey Robbins, Jr., When Two Liberal Values Collide in an Era of “Political Correctness”: First Amendment Protection as a Check on Speech-Based Title VII Hostile Environment Claims,
47 BAYLOR L. REV. 789, 792-793 (1995) (reiterating Judge Kozinski’s observation that the First
Amendment defense in sexual harassment cases is rarely raised).
81. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1534-1537 (M.D. Fla. 1991); see
LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 24, at 593 (noting that in an earlier decision, a free speech defense
had been raised sua sponte by the court (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419 (E.D.
Mich. 1984)).
82. See Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1515 (employer did not regulate employees’ practice of hanging pictures of nude and partially nude women because of his belief that the employees had
“constitutional rights” to post such pictures).
83. Id. at 1535 (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (“Potentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact . . . are entitled to no constitutional protection.”)).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1536 (citing United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171-85 (1987) (“performing similar
analysis for race-conscious remedy to race discrimination”)).
86. See, e.g., DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 596-97 (5th Cir. 1995)
(stating that Supreme Court precedent has not conclusively resolved the First Amendment question,
but finding it unnecessary on the facts of the case to explore that question further); Rabidue v.
Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 431-33 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (declining to address the First Amendment issue after finding the conduct alleged insufficient in itself to constitute a finding of hostile environment), aff’d, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
79.

DIVIDUALS,
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have explored the tension between First Amendment rights and the prohibition
of sexual harassment. One such case is Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, in
which the Ninth Circuit rejected a college student’s allegation that her teacher’s
87
unorthodox methods amounted to sexual harassment.
Although the court
touched on the availability of a First Amendment defense, it declined to define
the scope of the First Amendment’s protection of a college professor’s classroom
88
speech.
A California district court, however, did address a First Amendment argu89
ment directly in Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Dept. This district court
found that a fire department’s sexual harassment policy, prohibiting the private
reading of Playboy magazine at the station was in violation of the First Amend90
ment. It found that the prohibition was content-based and that it impermissi91
bly restricted the free expression of the firefighters.
In contrast, in Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co, a Minnesota district court wrote
that “Title VII may legitimately proscribe conduct, including undirected expressions of gender intolerance, which create an offensive working environment,”
and that the First Amendment is not violated simply because expression is
92
“swept up” in this proscription.
In support of a First Amendment defense to sexual harassment claims, it
may be argued that outside the workplace comparable speech has been found to
93
be entitled to protection. As the ACLU has suggested, all employees should
have free expression in the workplace “as long as that expression does not sub94
stantially interfere with workplace operations.” Whether verbal sexual harassment “substantially interferes” with the working conditions of the targeted
employee would probably have to be decided on a case by case basis.
Apart from arguing substantial interference, an employee could also argue
that (i) the use of words in connection with otherwise actionable conduct does
not immunize such conduct from appropriate regulation, and (ii) employees in
the workplace are in fact a captive audience, with no choice but to be present
and a part of a generally hierarchical structure, which enables a supervisor to
force them to listen to harassing words while sitting ‘captive’ at their desks or
95
while ‘trapped’ in the supervisor’s office or any other isolated business setting.
In response to the targeted employee’s ‘captive audience’ contention, an argument can also be made on behalf of the employer that the workplace is not a
captive audience because the speaker is no more free to go elsewhere than is the

87. Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 92 F.3d 968, 972-73 (9th Cir. 1996), (finding the
college’s sexual harassment policy to be unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant), cert.
denied, sub nom. Beeman v. Cohen 117 S. Ct. 1290 (1997). See also JANA HOWARD CAREY, AVOIDING
AND LITIGATING SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS 61-62 (1997).
88. See CAREY, supra note 87, at 62 (citing Cohen, 92 F.3d at 971).
89. Johnson v. County of L.A. Fire Dept., 865 F. Supp. 1430, 1442 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
90. See id. at 1442.
91. See id.
92. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 884 n.89 (D. Minn. 1993) (citing R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992)).
93. See Strossen, supra note 74, at 708.
94. Id. at 707 (citing ACLU POLICY GUIDE, at Policy No. 53).
95. See id. at 705-707.
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96

audience, and that selective viewpoint restriction is unconstitutional. Further,
one might argue that unless it constitutes intentional incitement to imminent illegal discrimination or violence, speech may not be suppressed simply because it
97
conveys ideas inconsistent with gender equality.
Despite the lack of clarity and guidance regarding the First Amendment defense in the sexual harassment context, the Supreme Court has yet to come out
with a definitive stance on the validity of the First Amendment as a defense to
sexual harassment claims, and there is little guidance elsewhere to indicate
98
whether such a defense is valid. As one commentator has suggested, the differentiation between protected expression and illegal harassment may in the end
99
have to be made on a case by case basis.
E. Equal Opportunity Harasser and the Bisexual Harasser
A final defense that is available to employers involves the situation where
the alleged harasser is accused of harassing members of both sexes. The harassser in this case has been labeled both the bisexual harasser and the equal opportunity harasser. Under one scenario, a bisexual defendant is accused of
sexually harassing members of both sexes, thus giving rise to the bisexual har100
asser defense.
Similarly, heterosexual or homosexual defendants accused of
sexually harassing members of both sexes may attempt to use the equal oppor101
tunity defense.
Regardless of the label used, the defense is based on the requirement that for an employer or individual to be held liable for sexual harassment, the offensive conduct, by definition, must occur “because of sex” under
102
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Thus, an employer may be able to claim that sexual harassment of an em103
ployee was not “because of sex” if an alleged harasser is bisexual. However, a
supervisor’s bisexuality is not sufficient in and of itself to preclude liability for
104
sexual harassment; the supervisor must actually harass both men and women.

96. See id. at 709.
97. See id. (citing Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
98. See DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 597 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating
that the Supreme Court has not conclusively resolved the First Amendment question).
99. See Strossen, supra note 74, at 715-17.
100. See generally Steven S. Locke, The Equal Opportunity Harasser as a Paradigm for Recognizing
Sexual Harassment of Homosexuals Under Title VII, 27 RUTGERS L. J. 383, 407 (1996) (defining an equal
opportunity harasser as a supervisor who creates a hostile environment for employees of both sexes,
and defining a bisexual harasser as a supervisor who engages in quid pro quo sexual harassment
against employees of both sexes.).
101. See Holman v. State of Indiana, 24 F. Supp. 2d 909, 915 (1998) (holding that the “equal opportunity harasser escapes the purview of Title VII liability”).
102. 42 U.S.C.  2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
103. For a discussion of the evolution of the bisexual defense, see generally Sandra Levitsky, Footnote 55: Closing the “Bisexual Defense” Loophole in Title VII Sexual Harassment Cases, 80 MINN. L. REV.
1013 (1996). See also Brief of Amicus Curiae Texas Ass’n of Bus. & Chambers of Commerce in Support of Respondent, 1997 WL 673838, at *5, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998
(1998) (No. 96-568) (arguing that recognizing same-sex harassment claims would encourage all alleged harassers to claim that they are bisexual).
104. See Michael D. Vhay, Comment, The Harms of Asking: Towards a Comprehensive Treatment of
Sexual Harassment Law, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 328, 348 nn.85-86 (1988) (arguing that if a bisexual har-
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Similarly, in the case of ‘equal opportunity harassers,’ where members of both
sexes are harassed, an employer may be able to claim that the alleged sexual
105
harassment was not “because of sex.” In either case, liability may be avoided
106
because victims were not singled out for harassment due to their sex.
Most
107
courts have determined that such harassment is not actionable under Title VII.
For example, in Barnes v. Costle, Judge Robinson discussed the possibility of
the bisexual defense theory, while addressing the feasibility of a claim under Title VII for same sex harassment:
These situations . . . are to be distinguished from a bisexual superior who conditions the employment opportunities of a subordinate of either gender upon
participation in a sexual affair. In the case of the bisexual superior, the insistence upon sexual favors would not constitute gender discrimination because it
108
would apply to male and female employees alike.

Due to a technicality in the wording of Title VII and an underlying philoso109
phy that emphasizes formal gender equality, rather than the actual detriments
caused by harassment in the workplace, sexual misconduct that would otherwise constitute harassment is not within the scope of the statutory prohibition
110
because everyone is subjected to similar treatment, regardless of gender.

asser targets both sexes, he or she may be able to avoid liability under an orientation analysis, but
would be held liable if gender stereotypes were a “but for” cause of the harassment).
105. See Levitsky, supra note 103, at 1026-1030. See, e.g., Cabaniss v. Coosa Valley Med. Ctr., No.
CV 93-PT-2710-E, 1995 WL 241937, at *26-28 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 20, 1995) (holding that the plaintiff did
not state a claim for sexual harassment because not only was there was no evidence that the medical
center knew of pervasive gender-based mistreatment, but the harasser had treated men and women
equally ); Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (D. Wyo. 1993) (using the term
“equal-opportunity” harasser for one whose inappropriate comments were directed at men and
women) (citation omitted).
106. Compare Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (stating that the essence of
a disparate treatment claim presented under Title VII is that the plaintiff is intentionally singled out
for adverse treatment on the bases of a prohibited characteristic); and Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d
934, 942 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that a plaintiff in a sexual harassment case filed under Title
VII must demonstrate that he or she would not have been subjected to harassment but for the fact of
his or her sex and that “[o]nly by a reductio ad absurdum could we imagine a case of harassment
that is not sex discrimination where a bisexual supervisor harasses men and women alike.”); and
EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1103-04 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (“When a homosexual supervisor is making offensive sexual advances to a subordinate of the same sex, and not doing so to
employees of the opposite sex, it absolutely is a situation where but for the subordinate’s sex, he
would not be subjected to that treatment.”), with Demele v. Belle of Orleans, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10728, at *17 (E.D. La. July 21 , 1997) (“Except in the exceedingly atypical case of a bisexual supervisor, it should be clear that sexual harassment is discrimination based on sex.”) (citing Jones v. Flagship Int’l, 793 F.2d 714, 720 n.5 (5th Cir. 1996)), and Ryczek v. Guest Servs., Inc. 877 F. Supp. 754, 761
(D.D.C. 1995) (stating that the D.C. Circuit did not recognize a cause of action for harassment under
Title VII when the supervisor is bisexual).
107. See Levitsky, supra note 103 and accompanying text. See also Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co.,
805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that one who commits equal opportunity harassment is
not violating Title VII’s prohibition against gender discrimination), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
108. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
109. See Levitsky, supra note 103, at 1028 (“Because Title VII is premised on an ideal of formal
equality that defines the discrimination as the act of treating men and women differently who are
actually similarly situated, equal opportunity harassment is not sex discrimination.”).
110. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 262 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
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Though not directly addressing the bisexual defense, the Supreme Court
enunciated its adherence to the “because of sex” requirement in Oncale v. Sun111
In Oncale, the Court held that same sex sexual
downer Offshore Services, Inc.
harassment is actionable under Title VII even if the harasser’s motivation was
not sexual desire, so long as the plaintiff can prove that the harassment was be112
cause of the victim’s sex. The Court stated that “Title VII does not prohibit all
verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it is directed only at
113
‘discrimina[tion] . . . because of . . . sex.’” Additionally the Court accepted Justice Ginsburg’s language from Harris v. Forklift System’s Inc., stating that “[t]he
critical issue, Title VII’s text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members
114
of the other sex are not exposed.”
The Court’s language in Oncale provides at least tangential support for the
equal opportunity harasser defense. If employees of both sexes are targeted by a
harasser, it can be argued that it is not “because of sex.”
III. UNIQUE EMPLOYER DEFENSES
‘Unique employer defenses’ are those defenses that refute specific elements
of the quid pro quo or hostile work environment tests. Defenses to a claim of
quid pro quo harassment include that (i) no adverse action was taken, or (ii)
there was a business justification for any action taken. Defenses unique to a
hostile work environment claim include that (i) the alleged conduct was not severe or pervasive, (ii) the conduct was not offensive to a reasonable person, (iii)
the conduct was customary in the prevailing work environment, and/or (iv)
prompt and effective remedial action was taken.
A. Quid Pro Quo
1. No Adverse Action
Until recently, to establish quid pro quo sexual harassment under Title VII a
plaintiff had to demonstrate that she suffered a loss of tangible employment
benefits or that her employment was tangibly affected, such as through dis-

(“[A] substantive violation of [Title VII] only occurs when consideration of an illegitimate criterion
is the ‘but-for’ cause of an adverse employment action.”); Sheehan v. Purolator, Inc., 839 F.2d 99,
105 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that a supervisor is not liable for sexual harassment because, among
other reasons, even though he displayed his temper to his employees, he did so discriminately), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 891 (1988); Hill v. K-Mart Corp., 699 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating that supervisor
treated male and female subordinates with equal indifference); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that there is no claim for sexual harassment where conduct is
equally offensive to both male and female employees); McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Servs.,
878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (holding that plaintiff must demonstrate her harassment was
based upon sex by establishing a but-for connection between her sex and the harassment and that
male employees were not treated similarly).
111. 118 S. Ct. 998, 1003 (1998) (holding that same-sex sexual harassment is within the coverage
of Title VII).
112. Id. at 1002.
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
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charge, demotion, withholding of favorable employment actions, or other disci115
plinary action. It was usually insufficient to merely show threatened job detriment together with evidence that the plaintiff refused to submit to the unwel116
come advances to avoid the adverse consequence.
Following the recent
117
Supreme Court decisions of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth and Faragher v.
118
City of Boca Raton, this once prevalent defense that the victim was not subject to
adverse consequences as a result of refusing to submit to unwelcome sexual ad119
vances has been neutralized.
In Ellerth, the Court held that an employee who suffers no adverse job con120
sequences can recover against his or her employer.
Although it is no longer
necessary for a plaintiff to demonstrate that she suffered an adverse employment action to successfully hold her employer liable for sexual harassment in the
workplace, an affirmative defense may be available to the employer if no tangi121
ble employment action was taken. Thus, although the inquiry into whether the
plaintiff suffered a tangible job detriment is no longer pivotal, it is still relevant.
2. A Business Justification Existed for the Employment Action
When there is an adverse tangible job action, an employer may rebut a
prima facie case of discrimination by showing a valid business reason for the
122
adverse employment action. In fact, the Second Circuit has admonished district courts that they should “not sit as a super-personnel department that reex123
amines an entity’s business decisions.”
The Second Circuit stated in another
case that “evidence that an employer made a poor business judgment in discharging an employee generally is insufficient to establish a genuine issue of fact
124
as to the credibility of the employer’s reasons.” Once the employer meets its

115. See, e.g., Flaherty v. Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 456-57 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding no adverse action when employee was terminated after turning down offer of lateral transfer with same
pay and benefits); Crady v. Liberty Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[A] materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment must be more disruptive than a
mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.”).
116. See, e.g., Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1011 (1995)
(“[I]t takes more than saber rattling alone to impose quid pro quo liability on an employer; the supervisor must have wielded the authority entrusted to him to subject the victim to adverse job consequences as a result of her refusal to submit to unwelcome sexual advances.”).
117. 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998).
118. 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
119. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2264 (The terms quid pro quo and hostile work environment are
helpful, perhaps, in making a rough demarcation between cases in which threats are carried out and
those where they are not or are absent altogether, but beyond this are of limited utility.). The Supreme Court’s determination that the labels of hostile work environment harassment and quid pro
quo harassment are relatively unimportant has not been followed by lower courts that continue to
label and analyze sexual harassment under separate categories. See, e.g., Rorie v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 151 F.3d 757 (8th Cir. 1998); Schmitz v. ING Sec., Futures & Options, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d
982 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Alverio v. Sam’s Warehouse Club, 9 F. Supp. 2d 955 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
120. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2259; see also Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2278-79.
121. See Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270.
122. See Scaria v. Rubin, 117 F.3d 652, 654 (2d Cir. 1997).
123. Id. at 655 (quoting Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1066 (1987)).
124. Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1116 (2d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
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burden of articulating a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged
employment action, the burden shifts to the plaintiff, who must demonstrate
125
that the proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination.
Accordingly, “to
survive a motion for summary judgment, plaintiff must put forth adequate evidence to support a rational finding that the legitimate non-discriminatory reasons proffered by the employer were false, and that more likely than not the
126
employee’s sex . . . was the real reason for the discharge [or discipline].”
127
Examples of legitimate business reasons include: poor work performance,
128
129
130
tardiness or absenteeism, lack of qualifications, failure to follow company
131
132
133
policy, employee’s misconduct, and lack of work. It is possible, however,
125. See Holt v. KMI-Continental, Inc., 95 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997).
126. Id. at 132. See also Rodriguez v. Canyon Club, No. 95 Civ. 6381, 1997 WL 297056, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. June 4, 1997) (granting employer’s summary judgment motion upon finding that plaintiff
failed to offer “actual, specific evidence . . . to prove that defendant’s proffered reason for the discharge is a pretext for illegal discrimination”).
127. See, e.g., Diggs v. Campbell, 54 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 773, 774 (D.D.C. 1990) (granting
summary judgment for employer upon demonstration that plaintiff was terminated due to “erratic”
performance, removal of corporate materials from premises, and unexplained absences); Christoforou v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 294, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (granting summary judgment for employer where plaintiff’s poor attitude and substandard work, including acceptance of a
non-certified, unapproved check that bounced, were legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for firing
plaintiff); Ramsey v. Olin Corp., 83 Civ. 1731 (RWS), 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23156, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 1, 1984) (employer successfully demonstrated plaintiff’s failure to keep up with orders, persistent errors, poor attitude, and desire to transfer).
128. See, e.g., Sheekey v. Nelson, No. 82-2085, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25964, at *14 (D.N.J. May 2,
1986) (finding that plaintiff demonstrated a “horrendous record of absences, tardiness and improper
procedures in shift-switching”).
129. See, e.g., Torriero v. Olin Corp., 684 F. Supp. 1165, 1171 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that termination of employee with many absences was lawful as it burdened other employees); Hosemann v.
Technical Materials, Inc., 554 F. Supp. 659, 667 (D.R.I. 1982) (holding that termination was reasonable by employer who held open plaintiff’s position for five weeks and was unable to ascertain
when she would return from disability leave).
130. See, e.g, Freedman v. American Standard, Inc., 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 471, 476
(D.N.J. 1986) (holding that plaintiff was discharged not because of sexual harassment, but because
of her inability to pass tests necessary for her position as a pilot), affd, 833 F.2d 304 (3d Cir. 1987);
Bouchet v. National Urban League, Inc., 730 F.2d 799, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that plaintiff was
properly terminated, as she lacked both experience and qualifications essential to her position).
131. See, e.g., Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding
that plaintiff was properly reprimanded for violating employer’s policy with respect to dress in the
workplace, workload required of employees, and policy about socializing with customers), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1035 (1986); Christoforou, 668 F. Supp. at 302 (holding that reprimand of employee was
proper, as she violated the company policy on working on weekends); Bookman v. Shakespeare
Co., 442 S.E. 2d 183, 184 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that employer properly terminated an employee for violating company policy regarding fighting in the workplace, despite her claim that the
incident was the result of sexual harassment that was improperly investigated by the employer).
132. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 615 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that plaintiff
was properly discharged for rudeness and failure to follow employer policies), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1041 (1987); Cooper v. Housing Auth., 67 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 617, 619 (N.D. Ala. 1995)
(holding that termination of employee alleging sexual harassment was lawful as she admitted insubordination and the record supported numerous incidents of misconduct), aff’d in part, remanded
in part, 79 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 1996), appeal after remand, 120 F.3d 275 (11th Cir. 1997); Jones v. Lyng,
669 F. Supp. 1108, 1122 (D.D.C. 1986) (holding that employee alleging transfer due to his disclosure
of sexual harassment of his female co-workers was transferred due to disloyalty, insubordination,
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that a court may determine that an otherwise legitimate business reason may be
pretextual if a decline in performance or failure to maintain other company
134
standards is the result of harassment. Additionally, the plaintiff may demonstrate pretext with evidence that other employees with similar work records
were not subjected to the same adverse employment actions or that the com135
pany’s disciplinary policy was not followed.
As a result, employers should
document charges of inappropriate behavior that reflect negatively on the em136
ployee’s performance and any subsequent warnings given to the employee.
B. Hostile Work Environment
1. The Conduct is Not Severe or Pervasive Enough to Constitute a Hostile
Work Environment
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender with respect to the compensation, terms, conditions
137
or privileges of employment. The Supreme Court stated in Meritor Savings Bank

and inadequate performance on the job); Grier v. Casey, 643 F. Supp. 298, 309 (W.D.N.C. 1986)
(holding that it was proper for employer to terminate employee for lying: “[P]laintiff has from the
time she falsified her application not been honest with her employer.”); Burns v. Terre Haute Reg’l
Hosp., 581 F. Supp. 1301, 1308 (S.D. Ind. 1983) (holding that termination for poor attitude was lawful). But see EEOC v. FLC & Bros. Rebel, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 864, 869 (W.D. Va. 1987) (holding that
personality conflict based on idea of appropriate behavior for women is not adequate as a business
justification for termination, and that employer’s justification of “unladylike” language used by
plaintiff is not appropriate as men and women are held to different standards) aff’d, 846 F.2d 70 (4th
Cir. 1988).
133. See, e.g., Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 544 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (permitting
employer to use lack of work defense, but then finding it pretextual as the employer hired a parttime employee to fill plaintiff’s position during decline in business period), aff’d, 749 F.2d 732 (11th
Cir. 1984).
134. See, e.g., Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (D.D.C. 1988) (finding that sexual harassment “affected the motivation and work performance of those who found such conduct repugnant and offensive” resulting in plaintiff’s alleged work related deficiencies); Delgado v. Lehman,
665 F. Supp. 460, 468 (E.D. Va. 1987) (finding that plaintiff’s supervisor interfered with the execution
of her duties and, therefore, contributed to her declining work performance); Lamb v. Drilco, Div. of
Smith Intl, 32 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 105, 107 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (holding that although plaintiff
was discharged following mistakes in measurements and paperwork and demonstrated poor work
performance, her termination was pretexual as her decline in productivity was the result of sexual
harassment at work).
135. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 646 F. Supp. 1274, 1278 (E.D. Tex. 1986)
(holding that pretext was demonstrated where plaintiff was given one corrective interview prior to
discharge while the policy required a verbal warning, written warning, and three day suspension
prior to termination); Macey v. World Airways, Inc., 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1426, 1430
(N.D. Cal. 1977) (holding employer liable when supervisor admitted that individuals with a similar
number of absences to the plaintiff were not terminated). But see Juarez v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 798, 805 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (stating, “[A]lthough reprehensible, sexual
harassment does not entitle the victim to [a] lifetime tenure at her place of employment.”), aff’d, 957
F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1992).
136. See Meyers v. I.T.T. Diversified Credit Corp., 527 F. Supp. 1064, 1069 (E.D. Mo. 1981)
(finding for plaintiff as her excessive absenteeism and disregard of duties were not documented by
employer).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
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138

v. Vinson, and later reaffirmed in Harris v. Forklift Systems and Faragher v. Boca
139
Raton , that not all offensive workplace conduct that may be described as
“harassment” affects a “term, condition or privilege” of employment within the
140
meaning of Title VII. For sexual harassment to be actionable, the environment
created must be “permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,’ . . . that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the vic141
tim’s employment.’”
Although a single egregious act can occasionally be
enough to create a hostile work environment, repeated incidents create a
stronger claim, with “the strength of the claim depending on the number of inci142
dents and the intensity of each incident.” A recurring point in opinions defining a hostile work environment is that “simple teasing, offhand comments, and
isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory
143
changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’ In addition, an environment must be hostile and abusive to both an objective person and to the actual
144
victim in order to be actionable under Title VII. In other words, if the victim
finds the environment hostile and abusive but an objective and reasonable person would not, the conduct is not actionable under Title VII.
145
To determine whether an environment is hostile, the Supreme Court in
Meritor, quoting the EEOC Guidelines, recommended a “totality of the circum146
147
stances” test , as later expanded in Harris v. Forklift Systems.
As a result of
138. 510 U.S. 17.
139. 118 S. Ct. 2275.
140. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
141. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65). The
EEOC has a similarly disjunctive test: conduct creates a hostile environment when it is (1) severe
enough to alter the complainant workplace experience, even thought the conduct occurred only
once or rarely, or (2) pervasive enough to alter the conditions of the workplace. EEOC Policy
Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, 8 FEP Man. at 405:6689, 405:6690-91.
142. King v. Board of Regents, 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990).
143. Faragher v. Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2283 (1998). See also Shiflett v. Ge Fanuc Automation Corp., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13186, at *11 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that although remarks about
plaintiff’s inattention and hearing problem may have been insensitive, they were not so pervasive or
severe and mean that reasonable person would find the workplace abusive); Turner v. Reynolds
Ford, Inc., No. 97-6152, 1998 WL 234540, at *5 (10th Cir. May 11, 1998) (finding that atmosphere was
not severe or pervasive when plaintiff complained that co-worker followed plaintiff around, tried to
talk to her and exchanged harsh words with her).
144. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. See also Cowan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 141 F.3d 751, 756
(7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that
conduct must “adversely affect the work performance and the well-being of both a reasonable person and the particular plaintiff bringing the action . . .”).
145. See Shiflett, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13186, at *10 (stating that the question of whether harassment is severe or pervasive enough is quintessentially a question of fact, but “[W]here the conduct is neither sufficiently severe nor pervasive to create an environment that a reasonable person
would find hostile or abusive, summary judgment is appropriate.” (citing Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas
& Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 753 (4th Cir. 1996)).
146. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986).
147. Circumstances to be considered in determining whether an environment is hostile “may
include frequency of discriminatory conduct, its severity, whether the conduct is humiliating or
physically threatening or is merely offensive, and whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with
employee’s work performance.” In addition, the effect of the employee’s psychological well-being
is relevant in determining whether the victim actually found the work environment to be hostile
and abusive. 510 U.S. at 22-33.
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Harris, courts are instructed by the Supreme Court to evaluate the “frequency of
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
148
with an employee’s work performance.” The use of these standards prevents
149
Title VII from evolving into a general civility code and filters out all claims that
do not involve extreme conduct that amounts to a change in the terms and con150
ditions of the employment.
Using the totality of the circumstances standard, the federal circuits and
district courts have developed the parameters of what constitutes severe or pervasive behavior, and typically use the severe or pervasive standard as a single
151
measure. Although distinct elements, severity and pervasiveness must be considered in tandem; the more severe the incidents become, the less pervasive they
152
need to be create a hostile environment. Harassing behavior, although offensive, is often held not severe or pervasive enough to be actionable under Title
153
VII.
148. Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2283 (1998) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23
(1993)).
149. Because Title VII is not a “general civility code”, it does not cover conduct that is merely
tinged with offensive sexual connotation and ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as occasional abusive language, gender-related jokes and teasing. Id. at 2283-84 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998)).
150. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
151. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991).
152. See id.
153. “When the workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,’
that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create
an abusive working environment’ Title VII is violated.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21
(1993) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67 (1986)). To determine if the alleged
harassment is actionable under Title VII, courts analyze the frequency and the offensiveness of the
allegedly sexually harassing comments and actions. See Hadrosek v. Paging Network, Inc., No. 962453, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 13698, at *12 (4th Cir. June 26, 1998) (holding that sporadic comments
and actions like superior’s chastising of plaintiff for leaving a baseball game early and telling plaintiff she should put on some makeup, and plaintiff hearing crude comments regarding women’s attractiveness were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute Title VII sexual harassment); Harrington v. Boysville of Mich., Inc., No. 97-1862, 1998 U.S. App. Lexis 9796, at *12-14 (6th Cir. May 13,
1998) (finding supervisor’s reference to plaintiff as “dumb broad” and a “bitch” coupled with alleged denials and delays in plaintiff’s bathroom breaks is insufficiently severe or pervasive to create
a hostile work environment); Cowan v. Prudential Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 751, 757 (7th Cir. 1998) (taking
all incidents together, like plaintiff’s receipt of the cold shoulder from co-workers, not inviting plaintiff to go fishing, sporadic derogatory name-calling not directed at plaintiff and occasional remarks
about strip clubs, the atmosphere was still not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively
hostile work environment); Clay v. California Empl. Dev. Dep’t, No. 96-17247, 1997 U.S. App.
LEXIS 30561 (9th Cir. Nov. 6, 1997) (touching plaintiff’s partially unbuttoned blouse and asking
what she was wearing under the blouse is not so severe or pervasive that an objectively reasonable
woman under the same circumstance would find the workplace hostile or abusive); Black v. Zaring
Homes, Inc., 104 F.3d 822, 826 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that sexually suggestive comments about females generally, that were repeated with frequency and disruptive at weekly meetings, were merely
offensive and were not pervasive or severe enough to create a hostile work environment), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 172 (1997); Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding
that there was no actionable harassment where plaintiff’s supervisor asked plaintiff out on dates,
called her a “dumb blonde,” placed his hand on her shoulder several times, placed “I love you”
signs in her work area, and attempted to kiss her on one or more occasions); Jones v. Clinton, 990 F.
Supp. 657, 675-76 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (“boorish and offensive” behavior on one occasion does not con-
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The Supreme Court recently noted in Faragher that it has followed the lead
of earlier discriminatory harassment cases based on race and national origin in
attempting to define the severity of the offensive conditions required to consti154
tute actionable sexual discrimination under Title VII. Courts have repeatedly
held that with respect to verbal utterances, “[a] mere utterance of an . . . epithet
which engenders offensive feelings in an employee does not sufficiently affect
155
the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII.” It is theoretically possible that a single incident of sexual assault is severe enough to sufficiently alter
the conditions of the victim’s employment; harassment need not rise to the level
156
of battery or rape to be actionable. Rather, the multiplicity of factors must be
considered to determine if the harassing conduct is severe enough to have al157
tered the complainant’s workplace experience. To be deemed pervasive and
therefore actionable, on the other hand, the allegedly harassing incidents must
158
be repeated, continuous and concerted; isolated incidents or occasional epi159
sodes will not merit relief. Fleeting hostility or abusiveness does not affect the
stitute hostile environment where conduct plaintiff subjected to not frequent, severe or threatening);
Christoforou v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 294, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that plaintiff
must allege more than relatively innocuous incidences of overbearing or provocative behavior for
acts to be severe).
154. Discourtesy or rudeness should not be confused with racial harassment. See Vance v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 863 F.2d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding isolated instances, like
nooses hanging over a black employee’s desk, were sufficiently severe to allow Title VII liability),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1155 (1995). See also Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184, 1189 (2d Cir.
1987) (determining that racially hostile work environment was not established when plaintiff alleged that supervisor berated him and used degrading terms and obscenities, as the incidents were
episodic and were not sufficiently continuous).
155. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. See also Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 435 (E.D. Mich.
1984) (finding no Title VII violation even though plaintiff worked with a very crude and vulgar person who made obscene comments about plaintiff and women generally), affd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
156. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68 (holding that where supervisor insisted that plaintiff have sex
with him on work premises, followed plaintiff into ladies’ room, fondled her in public and actually
raped her, court held actions were not only pervasive harassment, but also serious criminal conduct,
clearly sufficient for a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment); Smith v. St. Louis Univ., 109
F.3d 1261, 1264 (8th Cir. 1997) (determining that evidence that plaintiff was exposed to frequent and
regular harassment by supervisor, had been hospitalized twice for a disputable reason and suffered
depression because of the alleged harassment, could be found by a jury to be sufficiently severe or
pervasive to meet the Harris standard); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1305 (2d Cir. 1995)
(finding that when plaintiff was raped by two supervisors and one coworker after enduring eighteen months of verbal harassment, the “incident of sexual assault sufficiently alters the conditions of
the victims’s employment and clearly creates an abusive work environment for purposes of Title VII
liability”).
157. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
158 Isolated incident is a phrase used throughout the sexual harassment analysis and case law
and is usually used to convey that the act or harassment was not actionable under Title VII. However, isolated incident does not only mean one incident. Rather, it connotes “some number too
low to impress the court.” Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment With Respect, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 446, 499 n.331 (1997).
159. See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1305 (holding that verbal harassment standing alone is not enough to
create an abusive working environment; rather, incidents of harassment must occur in concert or
with a regularity that can be reasonably termed pervasive); see also Vigil v. City of Las Cruces, No.
96-2059, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 11808, at *5 (10th Cir. May 20, 1997) (finding that plaintiff’s “single
encounter with pornographic material left inside a folder by a previous worker and her supervisor’s
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workplace environment enough to alter the conditions of the victims employ160
ment and merit Title VII liability.
While a plaintiff need not prove that the
harassment persisted for an extended period of time, he or she must at least
161
show a pattern of harassment for the acts to be pervasive.
Pervasiveness is
162
more likely to be found if the harassment is caused by more than one person
163
and the effect of the harassing incidents is cumulative.
The requirement for
repeated exposure varies inversely with the severity of the offensiveness of the
incidents. The more severe the incidents become, the less pervasive they need to
164
be to create a hostile work environment.
If the conduct is not unusually severe, the incidents must be repeated and continuous, not isolated acts or occa-

single attempt to give her pornographic software” do not rise to an abusive environment); Barnes v.
Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., No. 95-6121 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 11539 (6th Cir. May 14, 1997)
(holding that plaintiff’s allegations that supervisor made sexual advances towards her on three occasions were isolated occurrences that were not severe or pervasive enough to support claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 626 (1997); Lam v. Curators of the
Univ. of Mo., 122 F.3d 654, 656 (8th Cir. 1997) (single exposure to a distasteful videotape is not severe or pervasive); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 753 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding
that temporally diffuse and ambiguous behavior, like positioning a magnifying glass over plaintiff’s
“crotch,” flipping over a tie to see the label and staring at plaintiff in the bathroom, that was intermittent over a seven-year period was not sufficiently pervasive to create a sufficiently hostile environment), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 70 (1996); DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir. 1996)
(finding that one vague comment inviting plaintiff to exchange sex for rent, while caressing plaintiff’s arm and back, may be unwelcome but does not create an objectively hostile environment);
Harris v. Clyburn, No. 94-1009, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 2819, at *8 (4th Cir. Feb. 3, 1995) (finding that
occasional tickling, coupled with suspicions of superior’s sexual desires, may be uncomfortable or
embarrassing to plaintiff, but does not qualify as sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the [victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment” (citation omitted));
Kotcher v. Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1992) (“[I]ncidents must
be repeated and continuous; isolated acts or occasional episodes will not merit relief.”); Clinton v.
Jones, 990 F. Supp. 657, 673 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (holding that one sexual advance was not so severe or
pervasive to have altered the conditions of plaintiff’s employment).
160. See supra note 153 (citations omitted).
161. See Sousa v. Bay Shore Dev. Corp., No. 93-8107-Civ-RYSKAMP, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10984, at *15 (S.D. Fla. June 24, 1994) (holding that although a plaintiff need not show that the illegal
conduct persisted for an extended period of time, she must at least demonstrate a pattern of sexual
harassment to prove that it was pervasive).
162. See Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 471 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that evidence that several different employees touched plaintiff in a sexual manner is enough to raise a triable issue of fact).
163. See Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 961 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that courts
must evaluate the totality of the employee’s experiences and not evaluate one incident at a time).
164. A single episode of harassment, if severe enough, can establish a hostile work environment.
See Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214, 1222-23 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that being forced to work in
close proximity to harasser’s sexual comments and physical advances was sufficiently severe and
pervasive, even if harassment was not continuous); Smith v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., No. 97-1561,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8631, at *12 (E.D. Penn. June 1, 1998) (determining that supervisory comments
that included “let’s get naked,” and “you need a man,” as well as touching of plaintiff’s buttocks
that occurred in a two month span may arguably be characterized as frequent and establish a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was a hostile work environment); Crisonino v.
New York City Hous. Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385, 389-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that a single incident
of assault, including touch above plaintiff’s breast when assaulter pushed victim, and an earlier reference to plaintiff as a dumb bitch, may form the basis for a hostile work environment charge because the stray remark may link the plaintiff’s gender to the complained-of action).
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165

sional episodes. Thus, relatively isolated instances of non-severe misconduct
166
will not support a hostile work environment claim.
In addition, harassing conduct can be severe or pervasive enough to create
an unlawful hostile work environment even if it has no tangible effects on job
167
performance or psychological well-being.
When a discriminatory abusive
work environment does not seriously affect an employee’s psychological wellbeing, it can still detract from “employees’ job performance, discourage employ168
ees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their careers.”
As long as the work environment “would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive, there is no need [for the environment] to be psy169
chologically injurious.” Thus, in order to determine whether conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive, it is important to look at the situation from the
perspective of a reasonable person.
2. Conduct Was Not Offensive to a Reasonable Person
The Supreme Court in Harris confirmed that to be actionable under Title
VII, an environment must be both objectively and subjectively hostile or abusive:
one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the vic170
tim in fact did perceive to be hostile or abusive.
A plaintiff must overcome
171
both hurdles to avoid rejection of her claims. The plaintiff loses if the conduct
172
at issue, viewed objectively, fails to meet either the severe or pervasive test,
173
or if he or she personally did not find the environment to be hostile or abusive.
Unfortunately, Harris did not resolve the significant issue of who is to be
165. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that requisite showing of severity varies inversely with the pervasiveness of the harassing conduct).
166. See Saxton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 10 F.3d 526, 533-34 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding relatively
limited instances of supervisor’s uninvited and unwelcome advances, impatience, inaccessibility
and teasing may be uncomfortable and offensive to plaintiff, but were not so severe or pervasive as
to create an objectively hostile work environment).
167. See Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
168. Id. (citation omitted).
169. Saxton, 10 F.3d at 533 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 22).
170. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. See also Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir. 1997)
(holding that if harassment is of such a quality or quantity that a reasonable employee would find
the conditions of her employment altered for the worse, it is actionable under Title VII, so long as
the employee subjectively experienced a hostile work environment”), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 563
(1997).
171. See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1483 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that
“[T]he subjective factor is crucial because it demonstrates that the alleged conduct injured this particular plaintiff giving her a claim for judicial relief. The objective factor, however, is the more critical for it is here that the finder of fact must actually determine whether the work environment is
sexually hostile . . .The objective standard protects the employer from the ‘hypersensitive’ employee,
but still serves the goal of equal opportunity by removing the walls of discrimination that deprive
women of self-respecting employment.”).
172. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (referring to the “idiosyncratic concerns of the rare hyper-sensitive employee”).
173. See Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 687 F. Supp. 848, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (requiring plaintiff must prove actual injury and offense); Saxton, 10 F.3d at 534 (holding the court should consider
“not only the effect the discriminatory conduct actually had on the plaintiff, but also the impact it
likely would have had on a reasonable employee in her position”) (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc.,
510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993)).
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the arbiter of the objective standard, the reasonable person or the reasonable
woman. In a leading Court of Appeals case, Ellison v. Brady, the Ninth Circuit
held that it adopted the reasonable woman standard “primarily because . . . a
sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to sys174
tematically ignore the experiences of women.” The Court in Harris used language that some perceived as rejecting the “reasonable woman” standard:
“[c]onduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile
or abusive work environment an environment that a reasonable person would
175
find hostile or abusive is beyond Title VII’s purview.”
Alternatively, some
176
courts have adopted a “reasonable person in [plaintiff]’s position” standard.
Although it is unclear what the proper objective perspective is, the Supreme
Court emphasized again in Faragher that having the objective and subjective
177
measures is critical to a hostile work environment analysis.
3. Prevailing Work Environment
Some courts have allowed employers to defend against hostile work environment harassment claims using a prevailing work environment or customary
178
business practice defense. This defense is frequently asserted to justify the use
179
of vulgar language in the workplace. At least one court, however, has determined that an assumption of the risk defense is not appropriate in precluding a
finding of liability against an employer in a case alleging both sexual harassment
180
and rape.
In the controversial case of Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Company, the court
stated that
a proper assessment or evaluation of a [plaintiff’s] employment environment

174. 924 F.2d at 879.
175. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
176. See, e.g., Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879 (using a “reasonable woman” standard); Andrews, 895 F.2d
at 1483 (incorporating an “objective factor” into the determination of whether a work environment
is hostile); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) (explaining that the person standing
in the shoes of the employee is the “reasonable woman”); Trotta v. Mobil Oil Corp., 788 F. Supp.
1336, 1350 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (courts can incorporate gender differences into a reasonable person
standard to avoid “trivializ[ing] the effects of sexual harassment upon a woman [and clinging] to
ingrained notions of what male offenders may consider reasonable behavior”).
177. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2283 (1998).
178. See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (to determine the
viability of a sexual harassment claim, court should look at several objective and subjective factors,
including prevailing work environment, i.e., “the lexicon of obscenity that pervaded the environment of the workplace both before and after the plaintiff’s introduction into its environs, coupled
with the reasonable expectation of the plaintiff upon voluntarily entering that environment”);
Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1045, 1051 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (holding that the atmosphere of workplace and plaintiff’s reasonable expectations regarding entering that workplace
are two of several factors for the court to consider in evaluating hostile environment claim).
179. See, e.g., Brown v. General Motors Corp., No. 88-0568-CV-W-9, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14779,
at *21 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 9, 1991) (“It appears that the use of profanity may have been a part of the
work environment at the Leeds plant.”); Halpert v. Wertheim & Co., No. 77 Civ. 6021, 1980 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13298, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 1980) (“The language of this market place was
coarse . . . referred to at the trial as “truck driver” language.”).
180. See Perkins v. Spivey, 911 F.2d 22, 31 (8th Cir. 1990), sub nom. Perkins v. General Motors
Corp., 449 U.S. 920 (1991).
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that gives rise to a sexual harassment claim would invite consideration of such
objective and subjective factors as the nature of the alleged harassment, the
background and experience of the plaintiff, her co-workers, and supervisors, the
totality of the physical environment of plaintiff’s work area, the lexicon of obscenity that pervaded the environment of the workplace both before and after
the plaintiff’s introduction into its environs, coupled with the reasonable ex181
pectation of the plaintiff upon voluntarily entering that environment.

Citing to the opinion of the District Court, the Court of Appeals concluded
that Title VII was not meant to alter work environments where “humor and language are rough hewn and vulgar” or “sexual conversations and girlie maga182
zines may abound.” This conclusion of the court is buttressed by the language
of the EEOC Guidelines, which emphasize that an evaluation of any environment must be based on the totality of the circumstances of each individual
183
case.
This case has drawn criticism, with one commentator stating that the view
taken by the court in Rabidue undermines the effectiveness of Title VII and
“thwarts the ability of the statute to make workplaces more open to women: Any
workplace that is currently obscene appears to have the right to stay that way, or
at least no woman who chooses to work there with knowledge of the prevailing
184
work environment has the right to complain about it.”
The response by the
EEOC was explicitly against the majority opinion of Rabidue. The EEOC Compliance manual states that:
In general, a woman does not forfeit her right to be free from sexual harassment
by choosing to work in an environment that has traditionally included vulgar,
anti-female language . . . . The Commission . . . agrees with the dissent in
Rabidue that a woman does not assume the risk of harassment by voluntarily
185
entering an abusive, anti-female environment.

Thus, the EEOC outright rejects the prevailing work environment defense
as a legitimate defense to a claim of sexual harassment. In addition, advocates of
the defense assert that it should only be used in suits that arise against nonemployees or where “sex appeal is a substantial part of [the plaintiff’s] em186
ployer’s business and of their job in particular.”
During the 1993 sexual harassment suit against Hooters Restaurant, the vi187
ability of this defense also evoked substantial controversy. Though some cases
181. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620.
182. Id. at 620-21 (stating that Title VII was not “designed to bring about a magical transformation in the social mores of American workers”).
183. See 29 C.F.R.  1604.11(b) (1997).
184. Kelly A. Cahill, Hooters: Should There Be an Assumption of Risk Defense to Some Hostile Work
Environment Sexual Harassment Claims?, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1107, 1135 (1995).
185. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) § 615, 3233 (1998).
186. Cahill, supra note 184, at 1138 (arguing that if this defense is not permitted, the risk of liability will prevent employers from promoting sex appeal in their business). She also argues that
this limitation of the assumption of risk defense was suggested by the court in Wilson v. Southwest
Airlines Co. Id. at 1139 (citing Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981)
(narrowing the bona fide occupational qualification defense to situations in which sex appeal is the
essence of the employer’s business)).
187. See Cahill, supra note 184, at 1130-33 (arguing that waitress plaintiffs may have knowingly
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have held that requiring female employees to wear provocative uniforms while
188
at work could violate Title VII and that employers may be held liable for har189
assment of employees by non-employees, one author asserted that an employer may be able to escape liability through the affirmative defense of as190
sumption of risk. Assumption of risk has been explained in one employment
case as
a phrase commonly used to describe a term or condition in the contract of employment . . . by which the employee agrees that certain dangers of injury, while
he is engaged in the service for which he is hired, shall be at the risk of the employee. Assumption of risk generally bars recovery by an employee who knows
of the danger in a situation but nevertheless voluntarily exposes himself to that
191
danger.

The assumption of the risk defense, like the prevailing work environment
defense, is based on voluntariness, consent, and knowledge, similar to the appli192
cation of the defense in the tort arena.
For instance, in the Hooters case it
seemed improbable that the waitresses were unaware of the nature of the restau193
rant when they applied for their positions and then began work.
Some courts have declined to accept the justification of prevailing work environment or customary business practice because of policy implications and the
acknowledgment of “the unique effect of such language on the morale and self194
esteem of women workers.” Despite this, use of this defense may not be completely eliminated as numerous other courts have acknowledged that “the presence of actionable sexual harassment would be different depending upon the
personality of the plaintiff and the prevailing work environment and must be
195
considered and evaluated upon an ad hoc basis.”
This defense does have
some advocates because it promotes the ability of women to make voluntary decisions and it allows women to choose to market their sexuality if they would

assumed the risk of verbal harassment by customers, but did not assume the risk of verbal or physical harassment by supervisors and fellow employees).
188. See, e.g., EEOC v. Newtown Inn Assocs., 647 F. Supp. 957 (E.D. Va. 1986).
189. See, e.g., Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1028 (D. Nev. 1992).
190. See Cahill, supra note 184, at 1116.
191. Perkins v. Spivey, 911 F.2d 22, 31-32 (8th Cir. 1990).
192. See generally Cahill, supra note 184, at 1117-21.
193. See Cahill, supra note 184, at 1131 n.136 (stating that employees are required to sign a copy
of Hooters’ sexual harassment policy which states that “female sex appeal is an essential ingredient
of the Hooters concept”).
194. 1 ALBA CONTE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: LAW AND PRACTICE 359 (2d ed.
1994). Cahill, in her article advocating use of the assumption of risk defense, acknowledges that
“[a]ssumption of risk has fallen into disfavor and Title VII has flourished because of the beliefs that
workers need the protection of the state and that the market operating alone does not sufficiently
protect the interests of workers.” Cahill, supra note 184, at 1121. She also notes the historical abuse
of the assumption of risk defense, especially during the Industrial Revolution. Id.
195. Eiland v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 92-CV-76328-DT, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18404, at *19-20 (E.D.
Mich. Sept. 30, 1997) (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986)); see
also Blackenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., Inc., 913 F. Supp. 1045, 1051 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (quoting Rabidue,
805 F.2d at 620), affd, 123 F.3d 868 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1039 (1998); Brown v. General Motors Corp., No. 88-0568-CV-W-9, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14779, at *17-18 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 9,
1991) (quoting Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620).
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196

4. Prompt and Effective Remedial Action
Courts have also found that prompt and effective remedial action will pre197
clude liability for claims of hostile work environment. While there is no bright
line definition of “prompt” regarding the time allowed to start an investigation
that precedes the remedial action, thirty-six hours has been considered suffi198
ciently prompt to initiate an investigation, but waiting three months before be199
ginning an investigation was untimely. As to the promptness of the remedial
action, courts have found that termination within six to ten days of the report of
200
harassment was prompt.
Generally, the test to determine whether the remedial action was effective is
whether the action was: (i) reasonably calculated to end the harassment;
(ii) proportionate to the seriousness of the conduct; and (iii) appropriately severe
201
to send the message that such conduct will not be tolerated at any level. Forms
202
of effective remedial action include firing the harasser or forcing him to resign,
203
suspending, demoting or transferring the harasser, giving a written repri204
205
mand, and removing offensive objects or pictures. But a five-month tempo196. See Cahill, supra note 184, at 1145.
197. See, e.g., Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143, 153-54 (2d Cir. 1997) (prompt and appropriate action in response to harassment complaint barred liability); Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc.,
29 F.3d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1994) (employer not liable for supervisor harassment where, in response to
complaint, employer took effective action to halt alleged harassment); Perkins v. General Motors
Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1487 (W.D. Mo. 1989), aff’d, 911 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1990) (no liability where, in response to complaint, employer took appropriate corrective action and the harassment ceased immediately).
198. See Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708, 715 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding no liability where employer investigated harassment complaint and notified harasser of investigation
within thirty-six hours).
199. See Dortz v. City of New York, 904 F. Supp. 127, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that waiting
three months to take action on employee’s sexual harassment complaint violated company policy
and was sufficient to establish employer liability).
200. See Van Zant, 80 F.3d at 715 (holding it was sufficient that the offender was reprimanded
and instructed in writing to limit his contact with the plaintiff within four days and was terminated
within ten); Walsh v. National Westminster Bancorp, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 168, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
(holding the remedial action was prompt and effective when the harasser was fired six days after his
behavior was reported).
201. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1998); cf. McCoy v. Macon Water Auth.,
966 F. Supp. 1209, 1219 (M.D. Ga. 1997) (“It is not necessary for an employer to fire, suspend, or
demote a supervisor whenever a complaint of sexual harassment is made . . . . In some situations,
particularly when there is some doubt as to the seriousness or the veracity of the charge or when the
complainant is unwilling to state a formal charge,” a warning or reiteration of the policy on sexual
harassment may be sufficient).
202. See Walsh, 921 F. Supp. at 173 (finding no liability for employer who investigated harassment complaint and fired harasser within six days); Torres v. New York Univ., No. 95 Civ. 4106
(L.L.S.), 1996 WL 393565, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1996), aff’d, 116 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 563 (1997) (holding employer “adequately responded” when promptly investigated the
complaint and fired harasser).
203. See Babcock v. Frank, 783 F. Supp. 800, 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding no liability when employer acted swiftly in investigating the harassment complaint and transferred harasser).
204. See Johnson v. Johnston Tombigbee Furniture Mfg. Co., 73 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 639,
640 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (finding that a reprimand was appropriate to the circumstances); see also Hop-
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rary demotion and transfer in one case and instructions to the harasser to speak
to the complaining employee only in the presence of others in another case have
206
been called “shams” and were therefore insufficient to preclude liability.
IV. RECENT AND YET TO BE TESTED DEFENSES
Heretofore, the previous defenses to sexual harassment have embodied
various permutations of the proposition that the conduct was not sexual harassment. In contrast, the new defenses stemming from the 1998 Supreme Court
cases enable employers to defend themselves in cases where the previous legal
construct would have found sexual harassment.
The danger for any employer in using new or untested defenses to a claim
of sexual harassment is that the courts have not fully formulated specific criteria
to use to undermine the viability of the defense. This is in contrast to the defenses previously discussed where an employer can point to cases with similar
factual scenarios or to specific criteria for the court to consider. Accordingly,
employers must tread carefully when using these recent or untested defenses.
A. The Faragher And Ellerth Affirmative Defenses
On the last day of the 1997-1998 term, the Supreme Court issued two opinions that radically changed the law of sexual harassment. In Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, the Court held that the employer was liable for sexual harassment,
despite the plaintiff’s failure to avail herself of the ineffectively disseminated
207
complaint procedure provided in the company sexual harassment policy.
In
Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, the Court determined that the employer would be
liable for sexual harassment although the plaintiff suffered no tangible employ208
ment action if an affirmative defense was not successfully proven on remand.
Read together, as intended by the Court, these two cases modified the standards
currently used to determine employer liability for sexual harassment.
The Supreme Court, using identical language in both cases, instituted a
new affirmative defense for employers against claims of harassment by the immediate or successively higher supervisor in which no tangible adverse employment action was taken. The Court stated:
When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise
an affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a preponder-

kins v. Nationwide Recovery Sys., Ltd., 1997 WL 42527, at *2 (N.D. Tex. 1997); Swentek v. USAir,
Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 558 (4th Cir. 1987).
205. See Tunis v. Corning Glass Works, 747 F. Supp. 951, 958–59 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d, 930 F.2d
910 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding hostile environment claim failed when employer promptly removed offensive photographs).
206. See Kotcher v. Rosa and Sullivan Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 64–65 (2d Cir. 1992)
(finding district court did not adequately address factual circumstances surrounding the harasser’s
five month demotion and transfer, which plaintiff contends was a “sham” response to sexual harassment complaint); Dortz v. City of New York, 904 F. Supp. 127, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding employer’s remedial action of instructing harasser to speak to the plaintiff only in the presence of others “did not effectively cleanse the hostile environment caused by the sexual harassment”).
207. 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2293 (1998).
208. 118 S. Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998).
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ance of the evidence . . . . The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a)
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities pro209
vided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.

These decisions also reaffirmed previous rulings holding employers vicariously liable for supervisory harassment when conduct culminates in some form
210
of tangible employment action such as discharge or demotion.
As of the writing of this paper, a number of cases have already begun to
apply the recent holdings of the Supreme Court. A few of the cases have merely
required that the sexual harassment issues be remanded in light of the affirma211
tive defense.
Others have focused on the reasonableness of the employee’s
212
failure to use the employee’s complaint procedure. And, one court has refused
to allow the affirmative defense where the alleged harasser was not the immedi213
ate or successively higher supervisor. Future litigation over the affirmative de209. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2293.
210. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. at 2270; Faragher, 118 S. Ct. at 2292-93.
211. See, e.g., Eddy Potash, Inc. v. Harrison, 118 S. Ct. 2364 (1998); Reynolds v. CSX Transp., Inc.,
118 S. Ct. 2364 (1998); Rorie v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 151 F.3d 757, 762 (8th Cir. 1998); Alverio v.
Sam’s Warehouse Club, 9 F. Supp. 2d 955, 961 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
212. See Fierro v. Saks Fifth Ave., 13 F. Supp. 2d 481, 492-493 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that because the plaintiff failed to (i) specify the repercussions he feared other than his general statement
that it would lead to unpleasantness if he complained; (ii) cite to other employees who were subjected to retaliation because they availed themselves of the complaint procedures; (iii) mention the
alleged harassment to his wife; or (iv) make any mention of it when informed that he was about to
be terminated, it confirmed that “any perceived harassment during [the plaintiff]’s employment was
so only by reason of its potential utility for this litigation” and observing that “to allow an employee
to circumvent the reasonable complaint requirements of Faragher and [Ellerth], by making conclusory allegations of feared repercussions would effectively eviscerate an affirmative defense which
the Supreme Court clearly went to great effort to craft in order to stem the tide of unwarranted lawsuits.”); Sconce v. Tandy Corp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 773, 778 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (observing that the plaintiff
admitted that she knew of the policy against sexual harassment and knew where to report the misconduct, but that she decided not to report it because her “supervisor threatened her with termination”; and therefore, finding “[p]erhaps plaintiff feared retaliation or further humiliation because the
procedures would not have been administered fairly. However, no evidence suggests that Defendant’s procedures were inadequate. . . . It follows that a threat of termination, without more, is not
enough to excuse an employee from following procedures adopted for her protection. To hold otherwise would render the affirmative defense meaningless. Evidence that procedures are administered fairly and that an employee is not required to report the misconduct to her harasser demonstrates the unreasonableness of the employee’s conduct.”); Booker v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., No. 3:
94-0048, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12962, at *36 (M.D. Tenn. July 10, 1998) (finding that the employer
had not proved that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to utilize the opportunities it provided to report and seek to correct his situation. “Budget has not asserted that it gave [the plaintiff] a copy of
the harassment policy, or that anyone spoke to him regarding this policy. Furthermore, [another
employee] testified that he had been afraid to speak to anyone about [the supervisor]’s behavior because he feared retaliation. Given the atmosphere at Budget, it has not been established by a preponderance of the evidence that [the plaintiff] was unreasonable in not reporting the harassment
given other employees’ fears about retribution.”); Montero v. AGCO Corp., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13956, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 1998) (finding that plaintiff’s fear of retaliation was not a reasonable
excuse for the failure to file a complaint where the policy called for confidentiality “within the necessary boundaries of the fact-finding process” and for non-relation against complainants).
213. See Alverio, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 961 (finding that the Faragher analysis should apply even
though the harasser was not the plaintiff’s immediate supervisor).
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fense will likely focus on whether or not there was a tangible employment action. In situations when a tangible employment action can be established by the
employee, employers will be forced to rely on defenses that existed before the
1998 Supreme Court decisions.
B. The Horseplay or Mild Flirtation Defense
A third Supreme Court opinion of import to the law of sexual harassment
214
from the employer’s perspective is Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.
As discussed previously, Oncale held that same sex sexual harassment was ac215
tionable under Title VII. Perhaps unintentionally, Oncale may have created a
216
new avenue of defense against claims of sexual harassment. The Court an217
nounced that, despite the contentions of amici, recognizing liability for same
sex harassment will not transform Title VII into a general code of civility in the
218
workplace. The Court explained:
Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it
is directed only at “discrimination . . . because of . . . sex.” We have never held
that workplace harassment, even harassment between men and women, is
automatically discrimination because of sex merely because the words used
219
have sexual context or connotations.

The Court continued:
[T]he statute does not reach genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men
and women routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the opposite
sex. The prohibition of harassment on the basis of sex requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in the workplace; it forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the “conditions” of the victim’s employment . . . . We have
always regarded that requirement as crucial, and as sufficient to ensure that
courts and juries do not mistake ordinary socializing in the workplacesuch as
male-on-male horseplay or intersexual flirtationfor discriminatory “conditions
220
of employment.”

Based on the Court’s language, employers may begin to argue that conduct
complained of by the plaintiff was merely social interaction and is therefore outside the scope of Title VII. In application, Oncale has yet to generate an increase
221
in the regulation of ordinary interaction in the workplace.
The reiteration of

214. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
215. See supra Part IIE.
216. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
217. Brief of Amicus Curiae for Respondents, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S.
Ct. 998 (1998).
218. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
219. Id. (citation omitted).
220. Id. at 1002-03 (citation omitted).
221. See, e.g., White v. Midwest Office Tech., Inc., No. 96-4116-DES 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6890 at
*21 (D. Kan. Apr. 28, 1998) (holding that the comments at issue were not demonstrative of gender
bias on the part of the employer; citing Oncale for the proposition that plaintiff must provide evidence “that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted ‘discrimination . . . because of . . . sex’”) (citations omitted).
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these enunciated standards in Faragher may create a whole new wave of judicial pronouncements based on this horseplay or mild flirtation type of defense.
Latching onto the Court’s disavowal of a general civility code, plaintiff’s
attorneys may try to broaden the definition of “male-on-male horseplay or intersexual flirtation” to cover the fact patterns of their particular clients. Without
more guidance from the Court concerning the interpretation of this language,
the court system will be part of an increasing number of debates over whether
recognizing specific conduct in certain contexts as sexual harassment would be
tantamount to accepting a general civility code at the expense of employers.
V. CONCLUSION
After only two previous Supreme Court decisions on sexual harassment
(Meritor and Harris), the three cases from the 1997-98 term (Oncale, Faragher and
Ellerth) have provided a glass that is both half-full and half-empty. In the wake
of these decisions, it is clear that there is still a great deal of maneuvering room
within the language of the Court. Attorneys on both sides of the issue have
claimed victory, extracting language from the Court’s latest opinions to assert an
advantage in the midst of this evolving construct of sexual harassment law.
Whether we now have more clarity or more unanswered questions on employer
defenses is an untold story, the proof of which shall be in the tasting.

222. See 118 S. Ct. at 2283-84. A recurring point in [recent] opinions is that “simple teasing,”, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory
changes in the “terms and conditions of employment.” These standards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does not become a “general civility code.” Properly applied, they will filter out complaints attacking “the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as
the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing.” It has been
made clear that conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment, and the Courts of Appeals have heeded this view. Id. (citations omitted).

